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Abstract 
This essay examines in detail the rhetorical means most commonly used in debates on 
environmental regulation. The article argues that debates on whether and how to regulate in 
the context of the environment often take the form of a predictable toing and froing between 
participants in such debates. The primary reason for this is found in the all too common 
reliance of participants on ready-to-hand arguments. These include: the pertinent point in 
time argument; the unripe point in time claim; the singular point of response argument; the 
sufficiency of existing structures claim; the presence of a particular risk argument; the one 
final measure argument; and the been here done that claim. By way of illustration, the article 
makes use of debates surrounding hydraulic fracturing in the UK in the form of the recently 
enacted Infrastructure Act 2015. The article concludes that the reliance on predictable means 
of rhetorical moves runs the risk of taking place at the expense of attempts to find a 
constructive middle-ground. 
Introduction 
Those who followed the debates surrounding the passing of the Infrastructure Act 2015 and 
its provisions on fracking would be forgiven for thinking that much of what was said and 
presented either for or against the Act came across as eerily familiar. Why is it that debates 
surrounding questions of whether new technologies ought to be subjected to regulation and, if 
so, what form the regulation ought to take, come across as similar to debates on whether 
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geoengineering is worth pursuing as a response to climate change? Maybe debates on 
environmental regulation and law, be it in Parliament, the popular press or academic journals, 
involve the use of a familiar set of argumentative moves? Taking its inspiration from Albert 
Hirschman’s The Rhetoric of Reaction, this essay argues that the rhetorical means by which 
debates on environmental regulation are advanced follow a well-trodden and, at bottom, 
predictable path.
1
 It does so by identifying the main methods and rhetorical means and by 
schematically setting out the various forms of rhetorical arguments most often advanced in 
debates on environmental regulation.
2
 In doing so, however, a note of caution ought to be 
struck, setting this essay apart from Hirschman’s work. In his original work, Hirschman 
outlined the standard methods of rhetoric and argumentation as falling along ‘progressive v 
reactionary’ lines. It is important to bear in mind that the label of ‘progressive v reactionary’ 
is not one denoting political or party affiliations. Instead it signifies the side on which each 
participant finds her/himself in relation to a proposed change. Thus, the points presented 
below are not an attempt to single out any particular political ideology or party line. As will 
become clear, each rhetorical tool and argument can be (and often is) utilised by disputants of 
varying political inclinations.  
To contextualise the schematic overview in a present context, the essay examines the way 
in which these rhetorical tools have been used in the context of recent debates on hydraulic 
fracking in the UK, specifically in the context of the passing of the Infrastructure Act 2015, 
which received Royal Assent on 12 February 2015. The reason for scrutinising the issue of 
rhetoric against a background of fracking is that, in order to comprehend the regulatory 
nature of environmental law, a need arises for understanding and appreciating the legislative 
context and history behind a given set of rules. More importantly, where scholars, legal 
campaigners and practitioners come to subsequently engage with the environmental rules, 
they often do so in order to persuade other participants in a practice that a particular 
understanding of the law is useful.
3
 Where this is the case, environmental lawyers are likely 
to rely on some of the rhetorical means referred to in this essay.  
Finally, the emphasis on rhetorical means and methods is to be understood and 
contextualised within some of the work currently being pursued on the role played by 
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‘frames’.4  The focus on rhetoric, however, is arguably more specific and represents a 
concrete expression of the particular frames within which participants operate. Frames are 
thus useful for understanding the general context and background of a given subject but 
rhetoric is arguably more relevant for lawyers as it highlights how environmental regulation 
and law is ‘practised’. That is, frames can be identified as the field/discursive formation 
within which particular types of rhetoric have force. Here ‘practise’ means not specifically 
the pursuit of objectives through litigation (though that is part of it) but the application, 
production and development of law more generally. This also includes the use of rhetorical 
methods and means in the regulatory process of defining, developing, applying and enforcing 
norms, rules and standards as well as the subsequent analysis of these by scholars.  
1. Reasoning and Responses 
In The Rhetoric of Reaction Hirschman sets out to ‘delineate formal types of argument or 
rhetoric’ favoured by progressive and reactionary participants in response to p-roposals for 
political changes as these have been utilised throughout the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries.
5
 The most 
often advanced rhetorical means identified by Hirschman and relied upon by so-called 
‘reactionaries’ are: the perversity thesis, according to which an attempt to remedy a particular 
problem only serves to exacerbate it; the futility thesis, which argues that any attempt to 
remedy a specific problem will simply fail to make any difference; and the jeopardy thesis, 
which posits that any proposed change will entail too high costs and endanger past 
achievements.
6
 As a response to these arguments, Hirschman identify the ‘progressive’ 
rejoinders which are: the synergy illusion, according to which ‘all good things go together’ 
and all reforms are mutually supportive; the imminent danger thesis, which urges political 
change in order to avoid disaster; and the having history on our side thesis, which argues that 
a proposed action enjoys support by powerful ‘historical forces [and] opposing them would 
be futile’.7 This overview is necessarily general in nature as it represents an examination of 
political reasoning throughout time. But it is possible to push Hirschman’s line of thinking 
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further in the attempt to apply it to debates on environmental regulation. In doing so, a series 
of additional arguments and rhetorical moves emerge.  
Temporal Reasoning and Responses 
The Pertinent Point in Time Argument 
Commonly, and as the name suggests, the pertinent point in time argument asserts that the 
particular point in time, give or take, at which a claim or argument is advanced, is the optimal 
point in time for implementing initiatives. The pertinent point in time argument thus sounds a 
note of urgency and presupposes a level of attentiveness on the part of the person invoking it. 
A slight variation on the pertinent point in time is the stronger version found further along the 
sequential line of reasoning: the ‘it’s now or never’ variation. The ‘it’s now or never’ 
argument rests on the assumption that a particular point in time represents a tipping point; a 
point from which, if no action is taken, it will simply be too late. The ‘it’s now or never’ 
argument thereby represents a stronger call for action compared to the pertinent point in time. 
This is because under the latter, the compelling need for action is felt less strongly than under 
the former. In a sense, the ‘it’s now or never’ argument is perhaps best viewed as a rhetorical 
tool often deployed as a last resort; if for no other reason than where its proponent is 
unsuccessful in persuading opponents of the need for action, the said need and window for 
action will come and go. Where the ‘it’s now or never’ moment has passed, little remains to 
be said for the simple reason that not only has the optimal point in time (as supported by the 
pertinent point in time argument) passed but so has the ultimate cut-off point as represented 
by the ‘it’s now or never’ claim. Where this is the case, little justification for action can be 
made, seeing as the impact, if indeed the ‘it’s now or never’ argument is correct, is now 
inevitable.
8
 
The Unripe Point in Time Argument 
The response with which the pertinent point in time claim and the ‘it’s now or never’ 
argument are most commonly met is the unripe point in time argument.
9
 Whereas the 
pertinent point in time claim and the ‘it’s now or never’ argument assert that the present 
represents varyingly an opportunity and a final point for responses, the unripe point in time 
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argument instead argues that taking action now is not warranted; for the right moment has not 
yet arrived. Instead, the unripe point in time argument lends emphasis to the claim that the 
costs of taking regulatory action far outweigh the gain akin to Hirschman’s futility thesis. In 
short, the unripe point in time argument is an argument of inaction; those who advance this 
view seek to maintain the status quo. At the heart of the unripe point in time argument is the 
assumption (mistaken though it may be) that the hard won gains of past reaction will be 
compromised. In doing so, the unripe point in time argument, like the pertinent point in time 
claim and the ‘it’s now or never’ claim, is perhaps guilty of narrowing the type of risks which 
are afforded attention (see below). Only, in the context of the unripe point in time argument, 
the emphasis is exclusively on the risk associated with taking action at the expense of other 
risks.   
 
Qualitative Reasoning and Responses 
The Singular Point of Response Argument 
In addition to arguments advanced on temporal grounds, an often utilised rhetorical technique 
is the claim that an initiative must take the form of one singular response. Often this 
argument is advanced on the back of a related claim, pointing out that existing structures are 
not sufficiently fit for purpose. The singular point of response argument thereby entails a 
certain disregard for existing structures. Central to the singular point of response argument is 
an assuredness amongst its proponents that they are capable of controlling the effects and 
implications (intended and unintended), resulting from the changes made to existing 
structures, akin Hayek’s ‘synoptic illusion’.10 Its proponents thereby come to rely on the 
assertion that they are, somehow, better equipped at assessing the implications of 
developments and the need for a response than those coming to the problem at an earlier 
point in time. The singular point of response argument thus rests on the understanding that 
any point in time is necessarily significantly advanced in terms of progress, knowledge and 
rationality compared to any comparable point in the past. And when this is the case, there is, 
of course, nothing wrong with rejecting existing structures from past, less-enlightened 
positions. Existing structures are seen as inappropriately ill-suited, or in the least hopelessly 
incoherent, to the current predicament.  
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The Sufficiency of Existing Structures Argument 
In light of the singular point of response argument’s emphasis on the need for reform the 
most often advanced ripost will surprise few. The reply, the sufficiency of existing structures 
argument, is typically that the changes proposed to the existing structures are, firstly, not 
necessary, and/or, secondly, too perverse. The first element is most commonly manifested 
where opponents of a response favour incremental as opposed to radical change. In an almost 
Burkean fashion, proponents of the sufficiency of existing structures argument urge ‘caution 
in reshaping existing institutions and in pursuing innovative policies.’11 In a direct response 
to the singular point of response argument, the sufficiency of existing structures argument 
will seek to point out that existing institutions have proved to be resilient and adaptive, and 
that the current proposal for change instead runs the risk of jeopardising the valuable 
advantages and experienced gained by incremental improvements, having taken place over 
time. Often this is followed by a claim that the changes proposed by the singular point of 
response argument will in fact not achieve the desired objectives. Instead, they will result in 
outcomes which are potentially significantly worse, resembling Hirschman’s perversity 
thesis.
12
 To paraphrase Hirschman: ‘the attempt to push society in a certain direction will 
result in its moving all right, but in the [wrong] direction’.13 
 In addition to the emphasis on unintended consequences, the proponent of the 
sufficiency of existing structures claim may well focus on the inherent argument of coherence 
in the singular point of response argument. In doing so, the proponent will likely point out 
that the insistence on coherence is untenable and simply an attempt to lend credibility to and 
add force to the argument of a singular point of response. Not only is the drive for coherence 
likely to result in unintended consequences, it is also ‘driven by [the] need to believe that [the 
singular point of response argument] is ordered, coherent and rational.’14  
 
The Presence of a Particular Risk Argument 
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As has already been alluded to, participants in a debate often are guilty of focusing 
exclusively on one risk at the expense of other risks. The point of focusing specifically on 
this characteristic here is not to dwell on the literature highlighting the idiosyncratic and 
individualistic approaches to risk but merely to highlight the rhetorical effects and 
consequences of this tendency.
15
 The identification of and exclusive emphasis on a particular 
risk is thus a method which is simultaneously relied upon by all parties to a debate often at 
the same time. The response to a proponent relying on the presence of a particular risk 
argument is thereby often to identify another risk and place equally strong emphasis on its 
presence in an attempt to counter an opponent’s risk reliance. The presence of a particular 
risk argument does not thereby follow the usual pattern of one line of reasoning being 
countered with an opposing response; for the response to the presence of a particular risk 
argument is the presence of a particular risk argument. 
 
 
Quantitative Reasoning and Responses 
The One Final Measure Argument 
In an attempt to highlight the need for addressing particular issues, quantitative arguments 
play an equally important role. The most common example, strongly linked to the ‘it’s now 
or never’ argument, is the one final measure argument which is, in part, a slippery slope type 
of argument.
16
 The one final measure argument asserts that at this point in time too many 
negative consequences have accumulated and that the particular issue before us represents the 
one point where we have no choice but to take action and not doing so will result in 
irreversible consequences. Herein lies the link to the ‘it’s now or never’ argument and its 
emphasis on tipping points, though the one final measure argument arguably asserts itself 
with a higher level of confidence as it rests on the accumulated basis that past failure to take 
action gives rise to a pool of accrued failures. This accumulation of failure therefore demands 
that action is taken. An additional force found in the one final measure argument is thus its 
slippery slope character which emphasises the claim that if certain activities are not 
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addressed, it will set a negative precedent for future situations. That is, from here on and 
onwards, things are only going to get worse if action is not taken. In this, the one final 
measure argument operates as a strong rallying call for its adherents insofar as it serves to 
garner support by claiming that this is the historical moment in time at which action and 
initiative is required. 
 
Been here, done that Response 
The response with which the one final measure argument is met is that there is nothing 
special nor spectacular about the present predicament. In other words, it has all been 
experienced before and the current point in time does not merit a specific initiative. Instead 
the ‘been here, done that’ response emphasises the claim that, notwithstanding the 
accumulated failures and the message of decline highlighted by the one final measure 
argument, things have never been better.
17
 Part of the optimism of the ‘been here, done that’ 
response compared to the one final measure argument may well be explained by differences 
in what each side of the argument diverts its attention towards. Akin to the presence of a 
particular risk argument, each side of the argument is likely guilty of focusing on specific 
indicators slightly different from those advanced by its opponent. Thus, the ‘been here, done 
that’ response will likely lend emphasis to a consequentialist line of argument and attach 
importance to, for example, overall levels of improvement (perhaps as measured by economic 
indicators) whereas the one final measure argument will typically focus on specific and 
concrete examples and case studies; examples in which overall background levels and 
improvements are notably absent. One difference between the two arguments is thus that one 
maintains a specific focus whereas the other often maintains a certain distance from the 
predicament which is seen as requiring action. The argument between the one final measure 
argument and the ‘been here, done that’ response thus often manifests itself in controversy 
over methodology. The former will typically contest the optimism of the latter by criticising 
the readiness with which it ignores specific predicaments and problems by way of generalised 
benchmarks and indicators on the assumption that these are too crude to register the real 
impact of any given predicament. 
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2. The Rhetorical Reasoning and Responses to Fracking 
If one applies the rhetorical tools and responses to the ongoing debates on the regulatory 
initiatives on fracking found in the Infrastructure Act 2015, it becomes clear just how familiar 
the different means of reasoning are. The main features of the Act receiving the most 
attention relate to the Act’s changes to the Petroleum Act 1998, introducing a primary 
emphasis on maximising the recovery of petroleum in the UK, changes introducing the right 
of use of deep-level land for the purposes of drilling and the introduction of certain 
safeguards in the context of fracking activities.
18
 The safeguards make the issuance of a well 
consent by the Secretary of State subject to certain requirements. These relate to: the 
assessment of environmental impacts; integrity of the well; monitoring of methane leakage; 
the protection of groundwater sources; and fracking activities within (as opposed to under) 
‘protected areas.’ 
The line of argument most prominently presenting itself in the context of fracking is 
the singular point of response argument. This is most evidently witnessed in the debates 
surrounding the existing regulatory system for fracking and the regulatory competences of, in 
England, the Environment Agency. It is, for example, regularly asserted that the current 
system for regulating fracking activities through an overlapping system of planning control 
(through local minerals planning consent), environmental permitting (covering various 
aspects of the fracking operation), petroleum extraction licensing and consent mechanisms 
managed by the Health and Safety Executive is not sufficiently robust or coherent. Thus in its 
Environmental Risks of Fracking the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 
argue that ‘changes to the regulatory system… do not however address the fundamental need 
for a more coherent and more joined-up regulatory system.’19 Similarly, in a recent report, the 
Task Force for Shale Gas recommend that ‘a bespoke regulator should be created’.20 The 
calls for a separate regulator by the Task Force highlight the point made earlier that the use of 
the different means of reasoning do not necessarily follow the political ‘progressive v. 
reactionary’ spectrum; for the Task Force is an industry funded body whose call for a 
singular regulator entity seemingly rests on an interest in a streamlined permitting process. In 
pursuing this argument, proponents inhibit the singular point of response argument par 
excellence. Seeing as existing regulatory structures have been drawn up with other 
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predicaments in mind, fracking is seen as deserving its own explicit, tailor-made response, 
specifically designed with the issue in mind. Existing structures are seen as inappropriately 
ill-suited, or in the least hopelessly incoherent, to the current predicament. 
Not surprisingly, the strong emphasis on the singular point of response argument in 
fracking debates has been met with rebuttals based on the sufficiency of existing structures 
claim. This is most notable in the deliberations and presentations taking place in the House of 
Lords. Here the Economic Affairs Committee’s, The Economic Impact on UK Energy Supply 
of Shale Gas and Oil, argues that the regulatory system is ‘rigorous and thorough and 
address[es] the environmental and health risks’.21 A similar line of reasoning was put forward 
by Lord Hollick in the parliamentary debates on the Infrastructure Bill in the context of 
monitoring of methane gas levels in groundwater
22
 and in the evidence given by the 
Environment Agency to the Environmental Audit Committee.
23
 In fact, one detects a hint of 
the ‘been here done that’ response in the evidence submitted by the Environment Agency 
when it observes that its risk assessment system ‘matches the current stage of development of 
the UK shale gas industry’.24 In other words, the current level of fracking activities in the UK 
does not merit specific attention beyond what it already receives. 
 Further support for the singular point of response argument is often based on the 
pertinent point in time argument. This is, for example, witnessed when the Task Force argues 
that a post-election government ought to establish a new regulator ‘as soon as possible’.25 In 
other words, act before the costs become too high. A slight variation on this emphasis on the 
pertinent point in time argument is found when participants come to rely on the ‘it’s now or 
never’ variation in support of an argument for restricting the exploration of shale gas entirely. 
One such example is found in the evidence submitted by Greenpeace to the Environmental 
Audit Committee, where Greenpeace argues that exploring shale gas reserves will make it 
impossible to meet the statutory targets of the Climate Change Act 2008.
26
 This point was 
supported by the Committee itself when it called for a moratorium on shale gas extraction by 
recommending changes to the Bill that would have changed its emphasis from one of 
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maximisation of extraction to one of ‘ensuring that fossil fuel emissions are limited [by] the 
carbon budgets’.27 In pursuing this argument, proponents of a moratorium edge towards 
utilising the one final measure argument when they argue that a moratorium is the only 
effective measure available in the attempt to prevent a slippery slope of climate change 
impacts. As one witness before the Committee argued: ‘it is counterproductive to be going 
looking for more fossil fuel reserves when we already know that we have to leave the 
majority of our existing fossil fuels underground.’28  
 Similarly, the government's keenness to pursue fracking reveals a reliance on one of 
the well-rehearsed rhetorical methods discussed above. By insisting on exploring petroleum 
resources irrespective of any statutory obligations in the Climate Change Act, the 
Government commits itself, at least implicitly, to Hirschman’s synergy illusion – the perhaps 
naive idea that everything goes together and that no conflict will arise as a result of the 
seemingly contradictory moves. The strongest example of this is arguably found in the 
evidence given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer before the Economic Affairs Committee, 
arguing that shale gas extractions is a ‘very good answer to those who want to see affordable 
energy while at the same time the UK makes a commitment to the reduction of global carbon 
emissions.’29  
 Against all of these different lines of reasoning is arguably a constant manifestation of 
the presence of a particular risk claim. The main difference being, of course, which risk each 
participant affords the strongest emphasis. It is evident that the input in the debate produced 
by the Environmental Audit Committee focuses on the potential environmental risks thereby 
seeking to lend emphasis to these by relying on the rhetorical means which support this. This 
is of course countered by an emphasis on the potential risk of negative impacts on the UK’s 
energy supply which a moratorium would entail as evidenced in the general theme emerging 
from the report by the Economic Affairs Committee and, ultimately, in the Act itself. In 
taking this approach, supporters of the Act inevitably come to rely on the ‘been here, done 
that’ response and its consequentialist emphasis on overall improvement of economic well-
being in the form of energy security and the promise of lower energy prices.  
 If one looks beyond the context of the Infrastructure Act towards debates on fracking 
more generally, it is equally evident how much of the debate centres around, at least, some of 
the rhetorical tools discussed here. This is particularly prominent in the literature produced by 
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non-governmental organisations, international organisations and in academic scholarship. In 
this body of work one thus finds a heavy reliance on the singular point of response 
argument.
30
 Thus, a 2011 European Parliament report recommends the adoption of specific 
EU measures on fracking
31
 and reliance on the singular point of response argument is 
similarly expressed, albeit implicitly, in some of the judicial review challenges launched 
against the planning permissions granted to fracking operators.
32
 This is perhaps not 
surprising considering that the participation of many of these commentators  rests on the 
commentators’ expertise and knowledge of regulatory systems; the singular point of response 
argument thus becomes a rhetorical tool which is readily at hand for this particular group of 
commentators. The point made here is not to determine whether these commentators are 
correct or not – a need for specific regulation may well exist. As one commentator 
persuasively argues: many participants often ‘confuse or conflate legislative coverage with 
legislative adequacy’.33 The point is simply to highlight that particular rhetorical means 
perhaps come easier to certain participants. Elsewhere in the literature, one similarly finds a 
heavy reliance on a combination of the pertinent point in time argument, the one final 
measure argument and the imminent danger thesis. This is particularly prevalent in the part of 
the literature seeking to link fracking with the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights on environmental rights
34
 (though a close reading of the Hardy and Maile v United 
Kingdom suggests that any ECHR responsibility is unlikely).
35
 
 
Conclusion 
This essay has highlighted, by way of reliance on Hirschman’s taxonomy of rhetorical means, 
that debates on environmental regulation often end up following predictable lines of 
reasoning. In support of this the Infrastructure Act 2015 and its provisions on fracking was 
utilised. The relevance of this for environmental lawyers is to be found in the fact that the 
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end-product of this rhetorical exercise - environmental regulation - is the environmental 
lawyer’s main object of study. Appreciating the rhetorical methods and means of reasoning 
shaping the regulation is important as this may well inform its subsequent practice and 
application. Moreover, if one comes to understand the rhetorical means as ready-to-hand riffs 
that provide a handy binary opposition to an opponent in a given debate, then this gives rise 
to a particularly pressing problem: whether reliance on these rhetorical means comes at the 
expense of (or indifference towards) the space found between the oppositions; that of the all-
important middle ground. If so, it seems a shame and one may well have to set sights on a 
less ambitious purpose as, it seems, Hirschman himself did: ‘this is probably all one can 
ask…: not to resolve issues, but to raise the level of debate.’36 
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